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Freviously'  published  studies  of  the  relationship  bettyeen
levels  of  self-esteem  and  CLognitive  dissonance  have  found
either  a  positive  relGtionshlp  betit.Gen  these  t`To  veri®bles
or  no  relationship  at  all.     In  most  studies,   self-esteem
was  either  contrived  by  deceptions  or  meg+sured  by  question-
able  procedures.
In  the  Current  investiflD8bion,   Self-estei€iffl  was  measurecl.
by  SIS.   ac.tu©1  scores  on  the  Tennessee  Self-Concept  Scale.
Usinfl`  a  forced  Compliance  essay  vLTriting  task,   evidence  of
dissonance  `fl'as  found  only  in  the  loil'est  of  four  level,a  of
self-esteem.     Questions  about  the  presf-`nt  resf arch,   and
implica.tions  for  the  8,reas  of  gelf~Concept  and  Coffn`it±ve
dissonance  ti'ere  discussed.
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The  Effects   of  Non~ManiTtul®ted
Self-Esteem  Ijevels  on  Cognitive  Digsongnce
In  a  Forced  Compliance  Siti`,iE`tion
Fe6tinger'S   {1957)   theory  of   Coffni.t.ive   dlgFhorlpnce   Ftptftf>
that  iwheh  gn  individuEil  e¥peri€ncrg  inconsi.qtpncy  in  hsg
thouffhts  or  actions,   he  tr'ill  be  "otivat,fd  to  real,lee  thi,a
Conflict.     Experiments  ln  this  field  have  tr,EdiLti,om'11.y
measured  dissonance  by  observing  the  ©mount  of  Chfnffe  in  the
individu©lls  attitudes  or  behpvior'  after  being.:  plriced  ln  f}
dissonance  producing`  E;itu8tion.
There  have  been  two  hypotheses  g!dvanced  as  to  t,he  reTr-
tionship  betig'een  Cop.:nitive  dissonance  and  self-esteem.
Aronson   (1969),   pondering  the  repe8te€l   findin£T  that  many
stibjects  appg-rently  do  not  experience  disgonpnce  in  gitue-
tions  designed  .bo  elicit   dissonance,   hgis  proTioF:ed  th_at
people  iTiith  high  self-esteem  are  REore  likely  th?n  peoTile
v,'ith  lot.'  Self-esteeffi  to  experi€.ince  disgonpnce.     ATi  individL
ual  with  high  self-esteem,   Aronson  re8E:ong.   ttil`,1  have  high
©xpeotat±ons  for  cor!sistency'  in  his  behavior  and   thoughts,
and  thus  vTill   experience  dissonance  trhen  he  8Cts  Contrary
to  his  self~image  and  expectations.     The  indirty`idual.  t"i+,h
low  self-eE5teem  has  lov"er  expectations  for  his  Cond,uct;
bher.efore  if  he  C`omfflits  an  act  in  Conflict  with  his  vel.ijeF`,
he  will  exper`ience  legs  dissonance.     Aronson  and  Mettee
(1968)   found  that  Subjects  `i.ho  were  told  they  had  a  lavt
self-concept  cheated  Significantly  more  at  a  card  game
than  subjects  told  they  had  a  high  self-concept.    The  e.xperi-
menters  claimed  that  this  result  showed  that  individuals
manipulated  to  believe  they  have  a  hiffh  or  low  self-concept
will  act  in  accordance-with  that  belief .     Aronson  and  Mettee
believe  this  result  supports  their  contention  that  those
TrTith  low  self-esteem will  act  in  a  less  desirable  way  morte
often  than  those  wi.th  high  selfngsteem.
Nel,   Helmreich,   and  Aronson  (1969)  used  Aronson  and
Metteels  (1968)  results  as  a  basis  to  propose  that  cognitive
dissonance  will  occur  when  an  individual  high  in  self-esteem
perceives  that  he  has  done  something  undesirable  or  incon-
sistent  with  his  high  opinion  of  himself.    Nel,  et  al.
conducted  an  experiment  in  which` subjects  were  asked  to
give  a  persuasive  speech  either  to  a  group  of  people  who
were  known  bo  be  naive  or` to  a  group whb  were  known  to  be
already  convinced  of  the  view  opposite  that  of  the  Speech.
Since  subjects  were  asked  to  persuade  others  to  views  con-
trary  to  their  ovm,  the  researchers  predicted  greater  dis-
sonance  among  those  asked  to  persuade  naive  others  than
among  those  a.shed  to  persuade  opposed  others.     Subjects
asked  to  persuade  naive  others-would  know  that  the  niave
others  were  vulnerable  to  persuasion,  and  success  in  per-
suading  others  would  be  an  undesired' outcome,   inconsistent
wfih  subjectsl  high  opinions  of  themselves.     As  pl`edicted
by  Nel,   et  al„  subjects  asked  to  persuade  naive  others
did  indeed  experience  significantly  more  dissonance.
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Cooper  and  Duncan   (1971)   disagreed  with  Aronson   (1969)
and  supported  Festinffer'S  orl8|nal  viei`'r.     They  suggested
that  all  individuals  who  commit  an  act  `"hick  they  ccmsider
to  be  immoral  or  indecent  `Nill.  experience  equal  dig.Fong!nce,
regardless  of  their  level  of  self-esteem.     These  researchers
sug&tegted  that.   Nel,   et  alls.   experiment  had  only  sho"'n  that
dis€jon&nce  incretise£.  as  consequences  become  more  avers.ive.
That  is.   subject  succes,c-  in  persus`dinp  naive  otherfi  to
viewpoints  actually  oppo`sed  by  the  subjects  themselves  `rould
be  more  aversive  than  ettemptinff  to  per*F;uade  subjects  irTho
had  8.1ready  determined  their  point  of  view.     Cooper  glnd
Duncan  conducted  an  experiment  in  which  subjects, of  nenipr-
1ated  high  and  low  self-esteem  levels  ffrrve`  persuasive
speeches   (videotg!ped)  in  opposition  to  tli,elf  o`i-n  views
for  both  hi£=h  and  lot..  amounts  of  re`,t'ard.     Self-esteem  levels
ir.ere  found  to  have  no  effects  on  amounts  of  dissonance
produced.
Thus,   some  res€`arch  suggests  that  the  hifi.:her  the  self-
esteem  the  f}'reateir   the  dis€®nance,   `?while  other  research
fails  to  find  any  relationship  be€v.eon  self-esteem  and
susceptibility  t®  dissonance  a.rousal.     Considering  tradi~
tional  interprets,tions  of  golf-esteem,  a  third  alternative
t®  these  tits"a  vle"7s  could  be  advanced.     This  third  h,ypothesis
would  propose  that  individuals  itTith  high  self-esteem  Tt.ould
be  less  susceptible  to  dissonance  arousaLl  thcin  individuals
vrith  |olrr  self-esteem.
Rogers   (1951)   s?totes  that   for  the  individual.  with   a
high  self-concept :
Ad®pt6!tion  to  any  life  situation  is  improved,
because  the  behavior  will  be  ffnided  by  a  more  com-
gI:::  g:!::egg,:a:fdEg:o5:::v:gi  ;::,::rge:!:3. (p.  53„
Hotrrever,   for  the  person  I,I'ith  a  lou-  self-Concept,   Roffers
sb€.ites  th&b  ''...all  experiences  ar.e  viewed  defensively  gis
p®tenbial  threats,   rather  than  for  `.That  they  reallgr  are
(p.   520).in
Coopersmith   (19f±7)   stg}tes  th€3t   the  consensu.a  of   the
major  theoristsl  vieitrs.  in  .the  EareaL  of  self-esteem  Supports
the  idea  that  hiffh  .Golf-esteem  ls  eqiJated  with  lou.Per  g!nxiety
and  a  ffreater  ability  t®  gee  situations  realistically.
I]ot"  self-er»t€€Im  is  seen  as  beinff  accompanied  by`  hiffh  finxiety
and  the  use  ®f  defensive  behavior  'to  counteract  any  threg}t
to  the  individualls  self-maint,Eiini"g  view+  Off  reality.     The
lower  the  self-concept,   the  more  ®nels  view  of  the  `!'orld
±s  determined  by  suhjective  inner  needs  rather  than.  the
objective  realities  of  onels  environment.
C®gnitive  dissonance  should  then  be  gregter  for  indi-
viduals  with  1®v„r  self-esteem  if  they  g}re   forced  to  do  or
think  something  C®n.brE,:ry  to  their  vE!.1ues.      They  tl'o"|d
become  thr.eatened  gmd  have  a  stronger  need  t®  r8.tion©1ize
the  situation  and  put  it  in  harmony  `r.ith  thej.I  self-pro-
tecting  v`iew  of  reality.     People  Trith  hiffh  self-esteem,
on  the  Other  hand,   would  be  better  a,ble  to  a;ee  the  git`]©-
bion  re©1istic©11y,   have  lesLs'  anxiety,   be  able  to  tolerate
more  imconsisteney,   and  have  less  need,  for  defensive
rationalization.     If  there  is  more   Lolergnce  for  incDns`it.=-
tency  and  legs;  need  for  I`8tionalization®   then  there  should
be  less  need  to  change  one's  views  after  being  forced  to
temporarily  opr3ose  s§uch  VievTs,   as  for  example,   in  the  'tlotl'
choice"  forced  Compliance  contrition  used  by  Brehm  and
Cohen   {1962).'
The  reason  findinffs  from  prior  research  have  not  si].p-
ported  this  hy.po'thesis  may  be  because  of  the  way`s  in  vthich
self-esteem  has  been  mg.niprlated  or  defined.     From  the
earliest  ehrperiment  in  this  areas   done  by  Br©mel   (19€2)I
to   the   RE.oat   recent,   conducted  by  C®o¥er  g!nd  Duncan   (1971),
all  pu".ished  experimen~ts  primarily  Concerned  with  li-nk-
ing  Self-Concept  to  a.is£,one,nee,   lrl'ith  or}re  exception,   llave
created  "high"  and  ''1otL`F''  self-esteerm  ffroups  by'  manipulated
feedback  to  gtibjects.'     That  is,   subjects  wer.e  given  tea,ts
of  self-esteem,   ostem,Sibly,  but,  ref:©rdless  of  actual  test
scores,   some  subject,s  were  told  thegiv  hid  high  Self-esteem
while  others  were  told  they  had  low  self-esteem. .   The
asLqumption  `i'as   that   Subject&q  I?rould  act   in  acaordaLnce  I.tith
the  levels  of  Self-esteem  they  irTr®r.a  told  the  te*qt  had  indi-
cated.
It   seems  hi&{hly  questiotiai31e  that   a_   trg}it   as  clef mlgr
rooted  in  the  individual  a.a  self-a,qteem  can  be  so  ea.€ily
manipulated.      EOLrerg   (19.51)   sLig£T,`e,¥ts  th€St   when  a,   person
is  presented  with  informg}tion  bhg!t  is  Contrary  to  his
tThe   exception  iir&s  .bbet   Nel,   et   ®1.    (1969)   merely  as.eumed
that  their  subjects  had  31,ormal  self-esteem.
self-concept,   he  tries  to  rationalize  or  ign{3re  it.     This
is  suggested  to  be  true  reffardless  of  `Jrhether  the  informa-
tion  would  raise  or  lov`'er  the  self-concept.     Cooper£`mith
(1967)  says  that  ".„self-apprg!isals  are  relatively  resis-
tant  'to  change  because  of  the  individug§1Is  need  for  psy-
chological  consistency  (p.   5).t''
If  self-esteem is  resistant  to  manipulation,  then,
by  definition,   ¢ooper  and  Duncan   (1971).   Ar`onson  and
Mettee   (1968),   and  Bramel   (1962)  wou.1d  not  have  succeeded
in  raising  or  lowering  self-esteem  by  manipulated  repor.ts
to  subjects.     All  these  stndies  failed  to  deterntine  by
independent  measures  of  self-esteem  whether  subjectsl self-
c®ncepts  rose  or  fell  according  to  how  they  \Tere  manipu-
lated.     Goop©r  and  Duncan   (1971}   and  Aronson  and  Mettee
(1968)  made  no  before-after  comparisons  of  self-esteem.
Bramel  (1962)  did  pre-test  for  self-esteem  levels  and
found  that  before  the  manipulation  attempt,   subjectsl
scores  were,   as  a  group.   average.     H®wever,   he  did  not
compare  the  later,   "manipulated"  sc®reg  with  the  pro-test
Ones.
Aponson  and  ifettee  (1968)  Suggested  that  their  experi-
mental  attempt  to  manipulate  self-esteem my  not  have
been  valid.    They  felt  that  tellins  a  subject  he  has  a
low  level  of  self-esteem  may  Cause  aggressive  feelings
toward  the  experimentei-  and  experiment,   thtls  causing  him
not  to  give  his  true  reactions  on  the  self-esteem test
given  after  the  manipulation  attempt.
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Another  explanation  for  the  conflict  in  findings
comes  independently  from  research  in  the  area  of  subject
bias  effects.     Rosenthal   (196.5)   and  Orne   (1962)   propose
that  subjects  who  volunteer  f®zp  experiments  have  above
average  needs  for  social  approval.     If  people  with  greater
needs  for  social  approval  have  lower  self-esteem,   as  might
be  hypothesized,   then  volunteer  subjects  would  be  expecsed
t®  be  below  average  in  self-esteerm.     Most  of  the  studies
thus  far. cited  have  used  volunteer  subjects.     Therefope,
it  is  possible  that  most  of  the  sub.iects  in  these  experi-
ments  were  low  in  self-esteem.     Since  onl,y  one  of  the   '
studies   (Bramel,   1962)  reported  testing  subjects  before
the  experiment  in  order  to  insure  a  normal  drfustribu.tion
of  self-esteem  levels,  this  hypothesis  remains  tenable.
Orne   (1962)  and  Argyris   (1968)   propose  that  subjects
may  make  a  concerted  attempt  to  perform  in  a  way  suggested
overtly  or  covertly  by  the  experimenter.     Thus,  a  sub,ject
told  that  he  has  a  high  or  Low  self-esteem  might  answer.
questions  on  a  test  of  self-esteem  in  the  way  he  thought
the  experimenter  desired.     However,   v*then  later  put  in  a
dissonance  prod.ucing  situa`tion  \TTithout  tinab  experimenter
present,   he  would  no  longer  have  an  indication  from  the
experimenter  of  v+'hat  his  self-concept  should  be.     He
might  feel  free  to  act  as  his  actual  self-concept  dictated.
Th'e  preceeding  has  suggested  a  need  to  reexamine
the  relationship  between  self-esteem  levels  and  amounts
of  cognitive  dissonance  arl`oused  in  a  forced  compliance
situation.     In  this  study,   self-esteem  was  measured  by
a,ctual  tests.     It  `.p,rag  predicted  that  there  would  be  an.
inverse  relationship  between  self-esteem  levels  and  amounts
af dissonance  aroused.2
rfet hod
Sub.jects
Subjects  (Ss)  consisted  of  the  first  80  volunteers
from  undergraduate  psychology  classes  at  Appalachian  State
University   (ASH).
Apparatus
The  Tennessee  Self-Concept  Scale   (TSCS),   counsel±ng
form,  pras  used  to ,measure  Sst   self-esteem  levels.
An  attitude  questionnaire  was  administer.ed  wrhich
served  two  functions.     First,   ±t  `iras  used+ to  determine
vThich  task  the  S.  would  perform  in  the  experimental  attempt
to  produce  dissonance,     The  question,   ''Do  you  agree  or
disagree  that  former  President  Nixon  should  have  been
pardoned?"  iras  used  to  deter`mine  that  dissonance  task.
If  the  S  favored  pa.rdoning,   he  prras  asked  to  write  an  essa{y
against  it  and  if  he  opposed  pardoning,   he  was  &gked  to
write  &n  essay  supporting  it.
The  second  function  of  the  questionnaire  vrag  to
measure  the  amount  of  dissonance  produced.     This  was  done
by  having  the  S  fill  out  the  questionnairer before  and  after
writing.  the  essay.     In  both  administrations  of  the
2Nu||  Hypothesis:    Self-esteem  levels  hi3ve  no  effect  on
levels  of  cog`nitive  dissonance.
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questionnaire,   the  8  indicated  his  answer  by  checking
a  lo-point  scale   (conti"u,in)  with  "strongly  agree"  marked
at  the  left  end  and  "Stronffly  disagree"  marked  at  the
right  end.     The  amount  of  dissonance  protluced  `i'as  defined
as  the  number.  of  points  this  answer  changed  in  the  direc-
ti®m  ®pp®site  the  S`'s  oriffinal  ansiirer  on  the  Nixon  question.
Three  other  questions  were  also  presented  ag  a  part
®f  the  questionnaire  t®  make  the  actual  task  less  obvious.
These  questions  were  worded  like  the  Nixon  question  and
also  had  lo-point  scale  answers.     Questions  asking  amount
of  agreement-disagreement  ®n  totally  nan-restricted  abor-
tions,   and  ®n  total  `]rtage~price  controls  we,re  presented
bef®F©  the  pardon  qt2estion,   and  following  ft  was  a  similar
question  on  registr&ti®n  of  all  fire  arms.
All  tests  were  administered  in  the  ASH  psychology
1©b®ratory.
E_eife
The  independent  varlables  ±n  thlg  experiment  were
the  Ssl   levels  of  self-esteem,   and  the  forced  compliance
dissonance  treatment.
After  all  tests  tFrere  administered,   each  ®f  the  60
Ss  assigned  t®  experimental  conditions  was  placed  in  One
of  four  groups,   aceordinff  t®  level  of  self-esteem.     Group
I  consisted  ®f  all.  S8  scoring  ln  the  top  qua.rter  ®n  the
test  ®f  self-esteem.     Group  11  isrere  those  scoring  ln  the
second  quarter;  Group  Ill,   those  in  the  third  qTiartep;
and  Group  IV,   those  in  the  b®tt®m  quarter.
Twenty  of  the  Ss  picked  at  random  were  chosen  as
control  Ss.     Control  Ssl   self-esteem  scores  were  divided
into  quartiles  in  the  same  manner  as  those  of  the  experi-
mental  Ss.     There  were  five  Ss  in  each  control  group.
They  were  not  subjected  to  a  forced  compliance  dissonance
arousal  treatment.     Instead,  they  received  a  neutr`a,1  treat-
ment   (described  in  the  Procedure  section).
Procedure
Ss  were  individually  administered  all  treatments  in
a  one-halfi  hour  session  scheduled  at  their  convenl©nce.
The  order  in  which  the  TSCS,   attitude  questionnaire,
and  the  forced  compliance  dissonance  ®r  control  essay
were  administered  ir.rag  randomized  for  each  S,   trrith  the
exception  that  the  attitnd©  qti@stionnaire  had  t®  precede
the  essay  so  that  the  instructions  for  writing  the  essay
(for  or  again,st  pardoning)   could  be  determined.     The
instructions  given  to  each  person  for  the  dissonance  and
Control  esEiays  were :
fig: , n{££  g3Eo:£t;:±b€®;nt£:8;¥r3:g¥±Ego £±¥o£:¥:r
President  Nixon.     Please  do  your  be,qt  t®  be  per-
suasive  in  your  argument,   even  if  this  argument
a:p:::n{:3:y  i:gg£¥:t ,wgh:e:::a;n±g3m:¥b£{:hg±3ase
Nixon.     Y®u  will  have  5  minutes  t®  write  your
eE5E5aLF.
In  the  dissonance  treatment,   those  Ss  `"ho  ans`rtei`ed
the  attitude  questionnaire  positively  (agreed  that  the
President  should  have  been  pardoned)  were  asked  to  arffue
against  pardoninff.     Those  ansir!ering  negativel.y  iwere  asked
to  argue  in  favor  of  pardoninff .     A  positive  answer  wra.s
considered  any'  ans`tJer  on  the  "agree"  side  of  the  continu,urn,
iE
and  a  negative  ansiwer,   anything  on  the"disagree"  side.
Control    Ss  were  asked  to  write  an  essay  in  agreement
with  the  view  the#`  stated  on  the  attitude  questionnaire.
At  the  end  of  the  experimental  session,   the  S  was
asked  to  complete  the  attitude  questionnaire  again.    After
completion  of  the  questionnaire,  he  was  asked  not  to  dis-
cuss  the  experiment  with  anyone  else.     He  was  told  that
an  explanation  of  the  experiment  and  its  results  would
be  given  to  all  Ss  at  a  meeting  at  a  later  time,  was
told  1,"hen  the  meeting  would  be  held,   and  \[ras  given  the
experimenterls  phone  number  in  the  event  that  the  S  could
not  attend  the  meeting.
One  extraneous  variable  that  this  experiment  attempted
to  measure  wag  a  possible  relation  betiEreen  Ssl   scores  on
the  TSCS  and  their  intelligence.    If  such  a  relationship
existed,  it  would  require  an  entir+ely  different  interpre-
tation  of  any  experimental  effects  obtained.    Thus,  using
each  S,.tls  composite  Scholastic  Apptitude  Test   (SAT)   score
(when  available)  as  a  rough  RT.easure  of  intelligence,   Ssl
SAT  scores  v7ere  correlated  iHrith  their  TSCS  scores.
Another  extraneous  variable  which  this  study  attempted
to  control  was  an  anticipated  ''historic  effect"  inherent
in  the  subject  of  the  essay.    Since  the  Opinion  of  an
S  on  the  Nixon  pardon  issue  miffht  change  from  day  to  day
because  of  publicity.  both  administrations  of  the  question-
naire  vttere  given  in  the  same  session.     The  issue  of  the
Nixon  pardon  was  selected  as  an  essay  topic  because  it
did  not  appear  to  contain  male-female  or  other`  biases,
yet  it  seemed  to  be  an  issue  that  would  evoke  the  strong
opinions  in  Ss  assurried  necessa,ry  to  facilitate  production
of  dissonance.
No  attempt  was  made  to  deceive  Ss.     Argyris   (1968)
has  argued  convincingly  that  Ss  do  not  give  their  natural
responses  after  a  deception  has  been  discovered,  and
that  a  discovery  of  deception  is  made  much  more  often
than  experimenters  realize.    Thus,  in  contrast  to  previous
experiments  with  forced  compliance  cognitive  dissonance
treatments  involving  essay  writing,   no  attempt  was  made
to  make  the  S  feel  that  his  essay  would  be  used  to  per-
suade  anyone  else  at  a  later  date.    Although  Festinger
{1957)  believes  that  dissonance  will  be  greater  if  the
S  believes  that  his  essay will  be  used  to  persuade  others,
Festinger  states  that  the  conflict  produced  bar writing
an  essay  contrary  to  onels  views  will  elicit  some  dis'-
sonance.
Requesting  the  control  groups  to  write  es-says  in
support  of  the  position  they  favored  was  included  to
determine  that  changes  in  attitude  were  dure  to  dissonance
arotisal  rmnipulations,  and  not  simply  to  any  essay writinff
task.    Such  a  control  has  not  been  used  in  most  dissonance
research.
Restllts
A  two~way  analysis  of  variance  of  the  dissonance
scores  found  that  the  selfueoncept  factor  was  significant
at  the  .051evel  (F=3.057>  2.748).     The  dissonance  factor
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was  not  found  to  be  significant,  using  the  .05  level
(F=1.386<4.001).     Group  means  are  presented  in  Table   1'
of  the  Appendix.
These  findings  indicated  that  the  amount  of  attitude
change  produced  in  some  of  the  individual  selfuesteen
groups  was  significantly  larger  than  that  produced  in
others..    However,   the  total  dissonance  produced  in  the
experimental  groups  was  not  significantly  more  than  that
produced  in  the  control  gI`oups.
A  test  of  least  significant  dif ference  was  used  to
determine  which  self-concept  gI`oups  had  significantly
greater  amounts  of  attitude  change.    Expel.imental  group
four,  which  had  the  lowest  selfuesteem  level  of  the  exper`i-
mental  groups,  had  more  change  (at  the  .05  level)  than  any
other  experimental  or  control  group,  with  one  exception.
'There  was  no   difference  in  attitude  change  between  experi-
mental  group  four  and  control  group  four.     Contl`ol  gr.oup
four  was  the  only  control  group  in  which  any  attitude
change  was  produced.     This  change  was  not  significantly
more  than  zero,   since  it  was  not  significantly  greater
than  that  occuring  in  any  other  control  groups.    There
ii,Jas  no  significant  difference  between  the  amounts  of
attitude  change  produced  in  any  other  two  groups.
Figure  1   (see  Appendix)  shows  the  distribution  of
all  Ssl   self-concept  scores,  using  the  norms  provided  in
the  TSCS  lfanual   (1965).     Figures  2  and  3  show  these  scores
graphed  separately  for  control  and  experimental  Ss.
From  these  figures  it  is  clear  that  most  scores  were
within  a  normal  range,  although  the  distributions  v/ere
somewhat  skeTwed  toward  lower  selfuesteem  scores.     The
mean  of  all  the  scores  obtained  was  335.55  and  the  mean
of  the  test  norm  was  345.57.     A  t-test  found  no  signifi-
cant  dif ference  at  the  +\05  level  beti.preen  the  mean  in
the  test  manual  a,nd  the  mean  of  ASU  Ss.     Neither  the  treat-
ment  group  mean  of  333.65  nor  the  control  group  mean  of
337.45  was  significantly  different  from  the  manual  mean,
nor  t.rere  the  treatment  and  control  group  means  significantly
different  from  each  other  (using  a  t-test  and  a  .05  level
o.if  siffnificance).     Tables  2  and  3  show  how  man,y  Ss  in  the
experimental  and  control  groups  came  from  each  area  under
the  normal  curve  established  by  the  TSCS  norms.
A  Pearson's  Product  Moment  of  Correlation  was  used
to  find  the  correlation  between  Ssl   TSCS  scores  and  SAT
scores.     The  correlation  for  the  treatment  group was  .07
and  vra.s  ;05  for  the  control  group.     Both  of  these  correla-
tions  did  not  differ  significantly  from  zero,   su,q`.gesting
that  results  were  not  confounded  b,y.  intelligence.     Seven
SAT  scores  were  unavailable  in  the  experimental  group
and  three  were  unavailable  in  the  control  gr.oup.     These
unobtainable  scores  were  distributed  evenly  throughout
the  distribution.
Eight  of  the  experimental  Ss  changed  their  opinion
on  the  Nixon  question  in  the  same  direction  as  their
ol`iginal  vie\Ir.     Brehm  and  Cohen   (1962)   suggest  that  when
such  a  change  occurs  under  dissonance  pl`oducing  condi-
tions,  it  may  actually  indicate  that  dissonance  is
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taking  place.     The  validity  of  such  a  conclusion  is  beyond
the  scope  of  this  experiment.     Since  attitude  change  was
defined  as  any  change  of  opinion  in  the  direction  opposite
to  onels  original  view,   these  eight  Ss  v`rere  scored  as
having  no  attitude  change.    These  Ss  were  distributed
fairly.  evenly  throughout  the  treatment  groups.    No  control
Ss  changed  their  views  in  the  same  direction  as  their
aHginal  views.
Discussion
The  results  of  this  study  give  partial  su.pport  to
the  hypothesis  that  the  level  of  selfLesteem  is  inversely
proportional  to  the  amount  of  cognitive  dissonance  (attitude
change)  prodnced.     However,  the  total  amonnt  of  dissonance
produced  in  the  experimental  groups  was  not  significantly
more  than  that  produced  in  the  control  groups.    Only
when  the  groups  were  compared  individually.   &s  was  allowed
in  the  present' study  by  a  significant  F  for  the  self-
concept  factor.  was  a  significant  level  of  attittide  change
found  ln  experimental  group  four.
Consistent  with  the  basic  hypothesis  of  this  ez[peri-
ment,  the  one  group  displaying  most  attitude  change  was
the  experimental  group  having  the  lowest  level  of  self-
esteem.     Significantly  more  change  was  produced  in  this
group  than  in  any  other,  with  the  excegivion  of  the  con-
trol  group with  the  lowest  level  of  self-esteem.
The  fact  that  any  attitude  change  occured  in  the
in  the  Control  ffroups  is  disturbing.    Although  the  change
was  not  significant,   it  wast  relatively  large  and  occur'ed
only  in  the  gr.oup  \iJith  lowest  self-esteem.     The  amount  of
change  might  well  have  been  significant,   but  for  the  very
small  N.  of  this  control  group.     Is  there  some  factor
other  than  chance  opperating  to  produce  a  change  in  the
attitudes  in  these  Ss?    `rhis  writer  believes  there  is,
and  suggests  that  a  possible  explanation  for  this  atti-
tude  change  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  self-concept.    The
control  Ss  were  suddenly  called  upon  to  write  an  essay
arguing  for  an  opinion  which  they  may  not  have  thought
about  a  great  deal.     It  is  possible `that  they would  have
doubts  about  that  opinion  as  they  attempted  to  define
and  evaluate  reasons  for  supporting  it.    These  doubts
could  easily  be  multiplied  in  the  minds  of  individ.uals
vrho  were  already  insecure,   perhaps  becoming  so  strong
as  to  cause  a  change  of  opinion.    Since  insecurity  is
a  primary  trait  of  individuals  with  low  self-concepts,
it  would  not  be  surprising  that  such  individuals  might
change  their  opinion.     This  could  even  be  a  kind  of  self-
induced  cognitive  dissonance  il„rhich  would  not  usually  be
manifested  in  people  with  very  louJ  self-concepts.     If
this  explanation  is  valid,   then  it  would  lend  support
to  the  vietFvr  that  low  self-concept  results  in  high  disso-
nance.     That  is,   even  the  extremely  small  amount  of  anxiety
` paresent  in  the  control  condition  v,Jas  enctugh  to  arouse
dissonance  in  the  group  i.I.'ith  low  self-esteem.     An  experi-
ment  similar  to  this  one,   but  in  which  a  much  lower  level
of  anxiety  could  be  aroused  in  the  control  Ss,  would  bti
of  benefit  in  clarifying  this  point.
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If  the  preceeding  explanation  is  supported  in  future
experiments,   there  are  serious  implications  for  dissontqnce
research.     It  would  mean  that  the  attitude  change  of  a
number  of  Ss  in  any  dis=:onance  experiment  mj.ght  be  the
result  of  the  Ssl  weak  self-concept.    Thus,   a  certain
"baseline"  of  cognitive  dissonance  rfught  occur  in  any
group  of  Ss  vw.ithout  any  experimental  attempt  to  produce
dissonance.     This  "rould  make  the  use  of  control  groups
crucial  in  dissonance  experiments.     It  would  also  cast
doubt  upon  many  previous  experiments  in  this  field  that
did  not  include  control  groups.
The  validity  of  this  argument  is  further  supported
by  the  present  experimentls  results.     The  inclusion  of  a
control  group,  and  the  subsequent  failure  to  find  signi-
ficant  differences  in  attitude  change  betv`Jeen  control
a,nd  treatment  groups,  have  ca:used  special  difficulties
in  interpretation.    Had  there  been  no  control  group,
had  Table  1   only  pres,ented  treatment  group  outcomes,
then  interpretation,  though  perhaps  incorrect,  would  have
been  easier.     Because  experimental  group  four  shoi.*+ed  sig-
nificantly  greater  attitude  reversal  than  experimental
groups  one,   two,   and  three,   the  experimental  hypothesis
would  have  been  clearly  supported.     As  predicted,   it
would  have  appeared  that  Ss  lowest  in  self-esteem  shoi,rred
most  dissonance  reducing  attitude  change  when  subjected
to  dissonance  arousal,  tirith  no  reservations  ahout  this
result.    Consistent  with  other  dissonance  research  in
which  control  groups  have  not  been  used,   it  would  have
been  tacitly  assumed  that  the  manipulations  of  the  experi-
menter  produced  dissonance,   and  that  attitude  reversal
among  low  self-esteem  subjects  reduced  dissonance.     The
unexpected  failure  of  the  experimental  ffroups  to  differ
significantly  in  attitude  reversal  from  the  control  gr`oups
makes  all  such  tacit  assumptions  suspect.    In  a  replica-
tion  using  larger  samples,   experimental  grou,ps  must  display
significantly  greater  attitude  reversal,  or  else  serf.ous
revision  and  reinterpretation  of  findings  in  al].  dissonance
research  will  be  necessary.
With  the  preceeding  reservations  noted,  it  may  be
said  that  the  results  of  this  study  contradict  Cooper
and  Duncan.a  1971   finding  that  selfuesteem  and  dissonance
levels  are  urmelated.    These  results  also  contradict  Nel,
et  alls.   1969  finding  that  levels  of  dissonance  and  self-
esteem  are  directly  related.    The  argiiment  that  different
results  are  obtained  using  measured  and  manipulated  self-
esteems  ls  ffiven  support  as  well.
This  writer  has  criticized  previous  experiments
linking  cognitive  dissonance  and  self-esteem  levels  because
they  did  not  Show  that  they  were  accurately  measuring
self-esteem  levels.    Neither  did  they  provide  evidence
that  they  ijrere  using  groups  of  Ss  with  normal  self-concept
scores.     This  experiment  em.t>1ogred  one  of  the  most  widely
used  measures  of  self-esteer3a  to  insure  that  art  accurate
picture  of  Ssl   self-concepts  ilr{¢ur±s  obtained.     Since  76.25%
of  the  Ssl  self--concept  scores  fell  within  +1   standard-
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deviation  from  the  mean,   and  since  the  means  of  the  self-
concept  scores  obtained  in  this  study  were  not  different
from  the  TSCS  norm,   it  would  appear  that  this  Study  has
also  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  sizeable  majority  of  Ss
who  had  normal  self-concepts.
The  distribution  `Iras  somewhat  skewed,   however.     The
data  in  Tables  2  and  3  show  that  the  lowest  self-concept
experimental  and  control  groups  were  nearly  filled  with
Ss  who  were  actually  vel`y  low  in  self-esteem,     However,
there  \i'as  not  as  much  success  in  repeating  this  for  the
high  self-concept  grou.ps.     The  present  studyls  finding
that  Only.  Ss  low  in  self-esteem  experienced' Significant
attitude  change  would  be  further  supported  by  an  experi-
ment  which  included  equal  numbers  of  Ss  with  very  high
and  very  low  self-esteems.
If  further  research  agrees  with  the  present  studyls
findings,  then  the  view  of  the  self-concept  as  an  indi-
cator  of  onels  deep  level  of  emotional  security  and  adjust-
ment  will  be  given  more  support.     Aronson   (1969)   appears
to  feel  that  the  self-concept  is  no  more  than  just  a  hiffh
or.  low  opinion  of  oneself ,   subject  to  moment  to  moment
vacillation  according  to  how  other  people  respond  to  us.
Ho`,vever,   if  levels  of  self-concept  are  just  dip ferinff  opin-
ions  of  oneself ,  then  an  individual  v,rith  lo`„  self-esteem
should  have  no  less  tolerance  for  ambiguity  (and  dissonance)
than  the  individual  with  high  self-esteem.     The  amount  of
anxiety  would  just  depend  on  whose  view  of  himself  is
contradicted.     If  the  self-concept  is  a  deeper  indicator`
of  security  and  adjustment,  then  the  individual  with  a
high  self-concept  is  always  going  to  experience  less
anxiety  and  react  better  to  stress  than  one  with  a  low
self-concept.     Thug,  in  the  present  study,  individuals
with  high  levels  of  self-esteem  tolerated  the  stress  of
dissonance  without  changing  their  opinions,   even  though
these  Ss  should  have  had  the  most  attitude  Change  if
Aronsonls  view  were  correct.     That  is,   Ss  with  hiffh  s©1f-
concepts  should  have  had  the  highest  opinions  of  themselves
and  thus  should  have  been  very  disturbed  by  writing  an
essay  supporting  a  position  they  opposed.     Instead,  those
with  high  self-esteems  tolderated  the  stress  better  and
their  opinions  remained  considerably  less  chan&.ed.     Those
with  low  self-concepts  could  not  tolerate  the  stress  as
\irell,   so  sous;ht  to  alleviate  it  by  Changing  their  opinions.
Again,  it  must  be  exphasized  that  this  explanationls
validity  is  dependent  upon  other  Studies  substantiation
of  the  present  one.
The  present  study  has  at  least  partially  confirmed
its  hypothesis.     However,   the  writer  is  somewhat  skepti-
cal  about  the  results  in  this  and  many  other  experiments
in  cognitive  dissonance.     One  ffroup'S  &ttibnde  chanffe
in  this  £>,tudy  v,rag  significant,   but  only  a  few  people  in
that  group  actually  manifested  a  change.     Unforttunately,
this  is  not  an  uncommon  finding  in  cognitive  dissonance
research.   `  Suppose  every  other  experiment  had  found  more
dissonance  in  the  group  having  low  selfuesteem.     If  only
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a  small  percentage  of  Ss  in  such  groups  actually  experi-
ence  dissonance,  then  we  still  have  the  problem  of  deter-
mining  what  really  causes  an  individual  to  manifest
dissonance.     Considering  the  tremendous  amount  of  research
already  done  in  this  field,   and  the  even  lar`ffer  amount
left  to  be  done,   the  cru,cial  question  becomes:    Is  the
payoff  worth  the  effort?    The  fact  that  Festinger  himself
has  left  the  field  is  all  the  more  reason  to  examine
this  question  closely.
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